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1. INTRODUCTION
There has emerged in recent years the pre-dominance of distinct
political principles. Since the fall of soviet-type regimes in
the late 1980's the political features of liberal democracy such
as constitutionalism, parliamentary democracy and a competitive
multi-party system have come to embody the meaning of democracy
internationally. With the collapse of Soviet-style communism even
socialists now find it difficult not to proclaim the liberal
democratic doctrine of representative democracy as the most
adequate form of democracy. The rush to endorse liberal democracy
is based, at least in part, on the widely shared view that non-
liberal political theories such as marxism are insufficiently
grounded in democratic theory. It is charged that the classical
marxist conceptions of the state and society ignore the crucial
contemporary problem of political differentiation.
Nevertheless, many today would insist that the traditional
liberal-democratic resources of theoretical reflection on the
problem of democracy are provincial and inadequate in the face
of the political realities of our time. The size and complexities
of multi-cultural modern societies, the development of new forms
of social stratification, the emergence of new social movements:
these and other features of the contemporary world call for new
categories of thinking on the problem of democracy. The liberal
democratic model provides the researcher with a thoroughly
abstract conception of democracy which is usually no more than
an idealized version of the functioning of democratic
institutions in the West. Research on democracy often takes the
form of a simple listing of the social conditions in different
historical settings which have led to a detachment of those
settings from the classical liberal-democratic experience of the
Western countries. As Laclau observes, this has led to a
conceptualisation of democracy in non-Western contexts in terms
of "insufficient development" or "deformations". (Laclau 1993:
2) As a result the Western experience operates as a logically
consistent and unchallenged paradigm without internal ambiguities
and different logical possibilities.
One example of the way in which the Western experience operates
as a logically dominant horizon can be found if we examine the
category of "representation". As Laclau points out, in classical
liberal-democratic theory representation is a one-way process.
A good representation is a transparent relation in which the
representative fully transmits the will of the represented.
However, in many third world societies there is a high degree of
marginalisation and people's identities are fragmented at the
level of civil society. In those conditions it is not really a
question of transmitting a will to the representatives, but of
how to constitute that will in the first place. In such
circumstances, populist leaders frequently assume the role of
giving to people, at the level of national politics, a language
and an image of themselves which allows them to have a higher
participation and to be able to represent themselves as
historical actors. (Laclau 1993: 4-5)
A second example of the way in which the liberal democratic
horizon limits research on the problem of democracy can be found
if we consider the problem of "civil society". In the last decade
or so people have begun to talk a lot again about civil society.
As Taylor observes, they are invoking largely, not the age-old
term used for centuries as synonymous with political society, but
rather the contrastive notion which figures in the philosophy of
Hegel. (See Taylor 1990) Civil society in this sense exists over
against the state, in partial independence from it. It includes
those dimensions of social life which cannot be confounded with,
or swallowed up by the state. The term in recent times has come
from several sources: In societies suffering from totalitarian
tyranny, it embodies the struggles of those fighting to open
spaces for independent action. The notion of civil society
expresses a programme of building independent forms of social
life free from state tutelage. In the West for centuries "civil
society" has existed as part of the history and practice of
Western democracies. The question arises: in how far are the
categories of state and civil society true categories of
universal democracy? Recently Partha Chatterjee has argued that
there exist a number of logical ambiguities with the category of
"civil society" in European thought. There exist two extreme
positions in European thought. On the' one hand, there are those
who abolish "community" altogether and think of rights as
grounded solely in the self-determining individual will, and on
the other hand there are those who attribute to "community" a
single determinate form (one tied to the history of capital and
the modern state). All other forms of community are delimited and
negated. Despite such negation, however, there can be seen to
exist within European thought an independent (and suppressed)
narrative of the category of a non-universal "community". In
Hegel, for example, the family is viewed as an "ethical" moment
(as opposed to a contractual one) and in this sense represents
a natural community. However, the family represents a suppressed
narrative of community, a narrative not recognised by those who
celebrate the absolute and natural sovereignty of the individual.
This narrative might be suppressed, but is, nonetheless, ever-
present. According to Chatterjee the family in Hegel can be
interpreted as embodying a subjective community within the single
community of civil society, thereby undercutting the universality
of the "civil society" community. (See Chatterjee 1990) Thus,
it could be argued that the category of civil society contains
within it at least one logical ambiguity: it divides the world
into two neatly opposed spaces, state and civil society, each
pictured as the only universal community, denying other lines of
fragmentation in society, while at the same time invoking images
of other, more hidden communities, both within and between civil
society and the state. At the very least this ambiguity puts into
question the privileged status of civil society (and the state)
as the only categories in and through which to understand the
spatial and political ordering of society (and democracy). The
contemporary scene (mainly in Third World countries but not only)
confronts us with many situations in which the term "civil
society" does not adequately describe the variety of different
spaces or worlds in which democratic practice occurs. Often the
practice of democracy does not take as its horizon the modern
state (and its practices), but rather non-state social practices
and the specific boundaries drawn around non-state cultural,
political or ethnic communities. As Chatterjee pointedly asks:
"What then are the true categories of universal
history? State and civil society? public and private?
social regulation and individual rights? Or the
narrative of community - untheorised, relegated to the
primordial zone of the natural, denied any
subjectivity that is not domesticated to the
requirements of the modern state.." (Chatterjee 1990:
132)
Are there then any true categories of universal democracy? In our
view (and following Laclau 1993), it is essential to avoid a
simple normative endeavour in any historical analysis of the
democratic identities. Democracy cannot be treated as a closed
theoretical space with pre-determined dimensions. Instead,
research must involve an ongoing search for a wider, richer and
more complex conception of democracy under historically
contingent conditions. The task of such research is to begin to
identify a plurality of dimensions (associated with democracy)
in and through which to understand the meaning of democracy in
specific historical contexts and with specific historical actors.
This paper is concerned with one particular civic organisation
and its place within the wider development of civil society in
South Africa. Civic organisations played a prominent role in
political protest and change in South Africa in the 1980's.
Although they were primarily concerned with protests against rent
increases and issues of housing, their actions impacted
significantly on the wider political organisation of civil
society. Civics, alongside other types of popular organisations,
shaped the overall political and democratic form of civil
society. Although the specific story of the Bellville South civic
can by no stretch of the imagination be seen to exhaust the
national civic movement's wider story (and its plurality of
dimensions), I believe that its history raises numerous pertinent
issues with regard to the wider strategic thinking on "democracy"
and "civil society" within opposition movements during the
1980's. In what follows I will argue that the political
strategies adopted by the civic's leadership reflected
significant differences with regard to the political contest over
the democratic form of civil society. The political ideology of
the civic's leadership was made up of two contrasting "logics"
vis-a-vis democracy. The one, which I characterise as "simple
polarisation", viewed the objective of the civic's struggles
primarily in terms of a competition for political dominance which
involved a simple dichotomy between the apartheid state and a
unified, undifferentiated opposition movement. Political
opposition to the state was conceived of as a homogenous
collective subject, unified in its common assault on the state.
This first conception of democracy divided the social world into
two halves, conceiving of the state and civil society as free-
standing objects, located outside of society. The specific
narrative of this particular conception of democracy,
nonetheless, challenges the traditional liberal-democratic
categories of "representation" in one respect: The civic was
successful in providing a previously acquiescent and "imageless"
community with an image of itself as a political community with
civic demands; Whilst some of its democratic practices were not
representative in the classical liberal-democratic sense, as a
catalyst of historical identity, the civic can be seen to have
played a crucial role in building a political world in which
relations of representation (and democracy) became possible in
the first place. The second political tradition within the
leadership of the civic viewed the organisation of opposition
primarily in pluralist institutional terms. This tradition
emphasised the building of civic independence outside the aegis
of specific sections of the liberation movement. Underlying this
tradition was a pluralist conception of democracy as
disassociated from the fate of any distinct social actor. This
current of thought avoided an essentialist conception of civil
society and the state. Instead of dividing the world into two
neatly opposed spheres, the civic located its struggles between
civil society and the state. Instead of accepting that the world
is divided into only two universal communities (civil society and
state), the civic asserted its very own "community" narrative,
an autonomous story which undercuts the categories of "civil
society" and the "state".
Popular organisations in the 1980 • s: The Historical and Political
Context
If the aim of research on democracy is to reach a more complex
conception of democracy, then the latter cannot be presupposed
as a starting point. It then becomes necessary to try to
determine a plurality of areas in which there are difficulties
in adapting an ill-defined notion of democracy to a particular
historical period. Following Laclau, we believe that we need to
begin by considering the political dimension, i.e. the listing
of areas of friction between an initial notion of democracy (in
this case the dominant liberal-democratic conception of
democracy) and the attempts at its implementation in a particular
historical period. (See Laclau 1993)
The specific wider historical context during the 1980's was
characterised by imbalances in the relation of forces between
groups and an adequate division of powers between groups as a
result of the apartheid's political structure. It is our
contention that the system of apartheid represented a "post-
totalitarian" type of regime. Western political science of the
fifties defined totalitarianism by a set of criteria such as the
presence of a charismatic leader, mass terror, the permanent
"purge", and ideological mobilisation. Classical theorists of
totalitarianism such as Friedrich and Brzezinski, for example,
argued for five features of totalitarian dictatorship: an
official ideology, a single mass party under a dictatorial
leader, terroristic authority of the secret police, centralised
control of the entire economy and a monopoly of arms. (See, for
example, Friedrich and Brzezinski 1964) These criteria were
superseded in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union by the advent
of Krushchevian reformism according to which the violence of the
Stalinist era was replaced with less overt forms of totalitarian
control - "post-totalitarian" forms of control. In the wake of
the events surrounding the revolutions of Budapest 1956, the 1968
Prague Spring and the struggles of the Polish trade union
movement Solidarity in 1980, a new approach to the Communist
system was pursued. "Post-totalitarian" states recognised that
the Stalinist methods of state domination and control , resulting
in the homogenisation of society were no longer tenable in
conditions of national diversity and modernisation. Whereas
totalitarian regimes of the Stalinist variant emphasised
centralised mobilisation for party-directed fulfilment of
ideological and social goals, post-totalitarian Communist regimes
"granted" increased autonomy for select groups. New techniques
of control included attempts by the regimes to bind the populace
to the party-state through a so-called social contract. Citizens
adapted themselves to the system by giving up their individual
rights (civil liberties and collective rights) and in exchange
received job security.
According to Rupnik, at the end of the day the debate about
whether or not a political system deserved the "totalitarian"
label hinges on the status of ideology. Under totalitarianism the
ultimate consequence of governance is the instrumentalisation
(under the party-state) of all components of society and, as a
consequence, society's loss of autonomy. Interpreting this
limitation of autonomy solely in terms of legal or penal
constraints is not enough. Autonomy can be limited in many other,
more "hidden", ideological ways. It can be limited by the fact
8that those in power tend to control all sources of circuits of
information and ideological discourse. This often amounts to,
what Rupnik calls, the "erosion of memory". In post-totalitarian
regimes ideology, then, becomes the chief means of homogenising
and integrating the ruling apparat. Often in post-totalitarian
regimes there is a dichotomy in the system: a ruling party-state
which clings to an ideological legitimacy, and society outside
of the state where there is a mere ideological ritual. (See
Rupnik 1988)
In our view apartheid rule involved a type of post-totalitarian
social contract in which society had no option but to
participate. The political order which the Nationalist Party
constructed after 1948 was aimed at enhancing Afrikaner
nationalism by entrenching white political control in South
Africa. Afrikaners governed not only themselves, but also all
other groups in society. The Nationalist Party saw itself as the
"grantor" of political life in South Africa. The Afrikaners'
mission as the mature volk was viewed as the ultimate rescue of
other demoralised volke.
The Nationalist Party's proclamation of its own status as the
"grantor" or "donor" of the entire form of South African society
translated itself into different forms of social control. On the
one hand the Nationalist Party did not conceal the jackboot.
Heavy penalties, including bannings and housearrests were imposed
even for non-violent, passive resistance to apartheid. On the
other hand there were also a range of "hidden" controls which
were post-totalitarian in character. One of the hallmarks of
Nationalist Party rule was the vast network of bureaucratic
controls (e.g. the pass laws and influx control laws) which
intimidated and de-moralised people and acted as a deterrent from
stepping out of line. Indirect coercion remained the major
control mechanism throughout different phases of apartheid rule
from 1948 to 1990. Throughout Nationalist Party rule the post-
totalitarian dichotomy remained in place: on the one hand, the




/ the sole "grantor" of freedom and clinging to artificial
/ constructions of ideological legitimacy, and on the other hand,
,/ a disbelieving and protest-ready society bound to the ruling
/ party through a set of overt and hidden controls.
A central theme of South Africa protest-ready society has always
been the struggle'against the exclusion of black South Africans
from any meaningful participation in the institutions of
representative democracy in South Africa. When the Union of South
Africa was formed in 1910, its Constitution excluded all blacks
from parliament and denied most of them the right to vote. Since
then the struggle for the extension of the franchise has played
a pivotal role in the development of "civil society" in South
Africa. Excluded from the institutions of political democracy
that were reserved only for whites (and from 1983 onwards for
coloureds and indians), black opposition movements grounded
themselves in a world separate from and in opposition to the
state - civil society.
While the complex social development of South Africa's civil
society defies strict categorisation, it is possible, in our view
(and following Weigle and Butterfield 1992), to identify four
stages in its ongoing development. Firstly, a "defensive" stage,
in which private individuals and independent groups actively or
passively defended their autonomy vis-a-vis the apartheid regime.
This phase lasted until the early 1970'8. During the 1940's and
1950 • s opponents of the apartheid regime had utilised the limited
opportunities of opposition tolerated by the state to defend
their autonomy. By the mid-1960 "s opposition turned to
underground activity and state repression had succeeded in
removing from civil society any visible and apparent oppositional
movement. (See Lodge 1983: 231-255) During the second "emergent"
phase of "civil society" opposition during the 1970's, an attempt
was made to re-build the foundations of an independent civil
society by carving out a realm of autonomy recognised as
legitimate and legal by the apartheid regime. During the 1970"s
the emergence of both the Black Consciousness movement and the
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independent trade union movement marked the beginning of a new
cycle in the development of civil society in South Africa. While
most of black society remained excluded from any formal political
process (and quiescent in the face of the threat of state
repression), both these movements became a visible reminder of
the apartheid regime's tenuous claims to represent a hegemonic
political project.
During the 1970's the Nationalist Party began to sanction a wider
public sphere which opened up new possibilities for opposition.
Growing black militancy, foreign pressure, changes in the
Afrikaner class composition and the fiscal crisis of the South
African state propelled the government away from classic
apartheid during this period. The dominant groups in South
African society began to realise that if their interests were to
be secured in the long term, the existing structures of social
control and political representation would have to be modified
to cater for at least some sectors of the black population. In
the space provided by new state reforms such as the Wiehahn
regulations and the tri-cameral parliament, national opposition
leaders formed the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983. The
formation of the UDF initiated the third phase in the ongoing
development of civil society. During this phase the emphasis was
on political mobilisation aimed at undermining the legitimacy of
the apartheid regime by offering alternative forms of governance
to a disenfranchised black political community. New tactics of
political opposition emerged: Student, consumer and voter
boycotts, mass demonstrations, national stayaways from work and
trade union opposition. During this phase civil society began to
represent a more stable democratic challenge. Prior to the
formation of the UDF the boundaries between the state and civil
society had been determined by the state, during the 1980's
opposition movement begun to build concrete and independent
oppositional centres that fundamentally challenged the centrality
of the Nationalist Party as the sole organiser of South African
society. Even in the face of harsh state repression, opposition
movements persisted in organising to articulate and attain
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independent goals. As the opposition became more and more adept
at publicising its aims and reaching a wider audience, its goals
became increasingly far-reaching. It began associate its goals
with the eradication of the entire apartheid system, including
the apartheid state. Slogans such as "dual power" and "people's
power" became part of the opposition movement's political
language. A central feature of civil society opposition during
this period was a belief on the part of opposition movements that
the basic contradiction of the apartheid system consisted in the
opposing interests of the ruling elite and society at large.
Consolidation against the apartheid system and its ruling elite
became a key objective of the opposition. The politics of the
struggle against racial domination cemented the opposition and
often transformed an atomized opposition into a collective
subject. This specific logic of political opposition quickly
became a source of both weakness and strength.
Many of the weaknesses were typical of a large internally
differentiated opposition whose partially artificial unity was
forced on it by the logic of confrontation with a powerful
adversary. By opening up the public sphere and raising hopes that
social groups could influence their own fate, umbrella bodies
such as the UDF created the impression that they were capable of
crystallising the pluralism of opinions and interest that were
present within the wider opposition movement. However, the fact
that the UDF took the form of one powerful mono-organisation
attempting to represent the oppressed masses as a whole (despite
enjoying enormous support) affected this process adversely. The
inadequate expression of real interest differentiation among its
constituency at times undermined its democratic impulse. In 1987,
for example, the UDF adopted the Freedom Charter, which gave
credence to a specifically charterist political programme. In
doing so, the UDF gave credence to the assumption that all
political (and otherwise) relevant knowledge is in possession of
a particularist political entity, the charterist strand of
political opposition to the apartheid state.
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Nonetheless, during the 1980's the opposition's success in
expanding the "public sphere" was significant. During this period
the public sphere became increasingly divided into two parts, the
oppositional and official varieties. The former became
increasingly free, while the latter underwent substantial changes
while its monopoly was broken. Towards the end of the 1980'a the
fourth phase of civil society was ushered in. While for the large
parts of the 1980's the dominant political conflict was between
two monolithic forces (state and society), there existed
nonetheless throughout this period a subtle movement away from
a logic of "simple polarisation" towards a logic which stressed
the institutionalisation of conflict within civil society itself.
Since 1990 both civil society and the state have undergone
significant changes and the result has been the slow growth of
a new political centre composed of more entities than simply the
apartheid regime and its opposition.
Thus, the specific historical environment of the Bellville South
civic organisation during the 1980"a was a complex one: it was
characterised by imbalances in the relation of forces between
groups which made impossible an adequate division of powers,
putting obstacles to the processes of representation and short-
circuiting the liberal-democratic (i.e. pluralist) functioning
of popular organisations, both nationally and locally. In State
control under apartheid continuously re-invented imbalances in
the relation of forces between groups by restricting the
functioning of popular organisations (and most other forms of
opposition to apartheid rule) in and through their continuous
exclusion from institutional (and often also non-institutional)
political arenas. Popular identities were continuously fragmented
on the plane of civil society and it was only with the formation
of the popular umbrella organisations such as the United
Democratic Front (UDF) that a systematic and sustained
construction of popular oppositional identity emerged. In order
to construct this identity popular organisations often had to
occupy (forcefully) and re-organise entire political arenas in
civil society in order to transform these into spaces for the
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expression of political wills. The result was a often complex
interplay (on the part of popular organisations) between
democratic and undemocratic political tactics and strategies.
Ceilings and Houses: The Bellville South Housing Action Committee
from 1979 -1982
The Bellville South Civic Organisation, originally named
the Bellville South Housing Action Committee, was launched in
1979. Bellville South is one of several pre-dominantly coloured
areas adjacent to white Bellville, a separate municipality in the
northern parts of metropolitan Cape Town. Bellville South was one
of several suburbs created to receive Cape Town's coloured
population during the apartheid era of "forced removal". A large
proportion of the inhabitants of these areas come from previously
racially integrated poor working class communities in nearby
Goodwood and Farow. During the late 1970's the Labour Party
campaigned around rent, housing issues and, in particular, around
the expropriation of land from the coloured community by the
National Party government.
Bellville South consists of Glenhaven, a middle class, mostly
professional community made up of academics, teachers, doctors,
lawyers and dentists, and the poorer working class areas which
are situated on the border of Bellville's industrial factory land.
Many of the women now work in Cape Town's textile industry and
many of the men in the building industry. High levels of
unemployment and gangsterism are common in many of these suburbs.
Although men are usually the main bread-winners in the house-
holds, many of the women work. Many of the residents of the
working class areas are factory-workers, municipal workers and
railway workers who come from the rural areas of the Western
Cape. It is in these working class areas that the civic was
launched.
The civic was launched in 1979 at the initiative of CAYCO (Cape
Town Youth Congress) activists who established contact with
14
selected residents on the poorer working class areas of Bellville
South. During the first three years of its existence the civic
focused its campaigns on bread-and-butter issues. The major
campaigns were for the electrification of houses and the
installation of ceilings. These early campaigns were concerned
with seeking incremental gains in material conditions, rather
than with attaining explicitly political goals. As one of the
founding activists commented:
"In the beginning we did not think of politics. We had
no ceilings and no doors. Die dae was hard. Daar was
net kerse en lampolie." (Interview with author,
November 1993)
And also:
"None of us were politically motivated, in the
beginning this thing was not a political thing."
(Interview with author, November 1993)
Early methods of mobilisation included the organisation of yard-
and street meetings in order to increase popular support. As one
activist pointed out
"We used people's yards for meetings, because our
houses were too small." (Interview with author,
November 1993)
Many petitions and delegations were sent to the Management
Committee and the Bellville Council with demands for improvement
to ceilings and the installation of electricity. On occasion the
Housing Action Committee managed to organise small marches in
which up to 300 residents participated. These marches were seen
as important tactics in and through which to put the message
across that "the people can gain power".
During the first three years of the civic'a life its strategies
and tactics remained largely self-limiting. Its main aim was to
defend its autonomy vis-a-vis municipal authority intervention
and to secure short-term victories around specific material
issues. This modest aim can be seen to have involved profound
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implications for the development of civil society opposition. In
a minimal sense, civil society exists where there are free
associations, not under the tutelage of state power. In a
stronger sense, civil society exists where society as a whole can
structure itself and co-ordinate its actions through such
associations which are free of state tutelage. As an alternative
or supplement in the second sense, we can speak of civil society
wherever the ensemble of associations can significantly determine
or inflect the course of state policy. (See Taylor 1993) During
the early history of the civic, civil society in the "minimal"
sense was established. The civic's early struggles were not
always successful, but nonetheless constituted an important
moment in the freeing of associational life from the overwhelming
presence of the state in Bellville South. As such the mere
formation of the civic and its attempt to forge a unified support
base can be viewed to have constituted an important democratic
moment in the construction of "civil society". The civic acted
as a catalyst for the formation of political identity-formation
which, in turn, made possible the emergence of a new political
space for relations of representation.
The Bellville Residents' Association and a Wider Political
Strategy: 1982-1988
In 1982 the Bellville South Housing Action Committee affiliated
to CAHAC (Cape Housing Action Committee) which, in turn,
affiliated to the UDF in 1983. In the words of one of the
executive committee members of the civic at the time,
"leading CAYCO activists convinced us that we would
benefit from affiliating to CAHAC. CAHAC made the
political link for us".
The Housing Action Committee's affiliation to CAHAC, a regional
charterist civic umbrella initiative, ushered in a new phase for
the local civic organisation. While maintaining its focus on
material gains, the organisation became increasingly involved in
wider political campaigns which were aimed at strengthening the
political struggle against the apartheid state. Host of the
civic's executive members became deeply involved in the UDF'8
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Northern Areas committee.
From 1983 onwards the civic organisation began to organise
overtly political campaigns which focused on the release of
political prisoners and the unbanning of political organisations.
With this change in strategy came severe state repression and
many leading activists were detained. Repression affected not
only the older civic leadership, but also and often more
brutally, youth members.
During this phase the civic began to construct a more stable and
coherent political challenge to the apartheid municipal system.
Whereas before the 1980'a the boundaries between the state's
municipal councils and the civic organisation had often been
dictated by the state as the Housing Action Committee persisted
in hopeful, but often fruitless attempts to persuade the council
to upgrade residents' houses, from 1982 onwards the civic
organisation began to build concrete oppositional political
centres in Bellville South. From 1985 onwards the civic
organisation attempted to widen its popular support by
establishing an advice office in order to deal with popular
grievances. The advice office was situated in the centre of
Bellville South and quickly became a popular alternative to the
local management committee's attempts to reach out to the
residents. Initially the advice office had been set up in order
to monitor repression in the area, but it later expanded its
activities to include the monitoring of evictions in rent arrear
cases. The advice office quickly became an alternative pocket of
local governance and the centre of an autonomous "community"
story.
As the civic attempted to deepen its influence in the public
sphere of Bellville South, it increasingly was confronted with
challenges to its attempt to consolidate a unified oppositional
subject in the area. In 1982 the civic organisation had become
involved in the establishment of a health project in the area.
From 1985 onwards the clinic (which had been built in 1983)
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became a site of political contestation between the charterist
aligned civic and a group of individuals affiliated to the
Marxist Workers' Tendency. At the same time the New Unity
Movement launched a rival civic organisation called the
"Burgerlike Vereeniging". The establishment of an alternative
civic organisation posed new challenges for the charterist
aligned civic.
For many of the civic activists the oppositional unity in the
civic organisation had to be extended to other parts of the
community as well. It was seen as important by the civic
leadership to imprint the charterist identity of the civic onto
other community structures and when attempts were made by rival
political organisations to politically contest these community
facilities, the civic leadership felt it necessary to oppose such
attempts. Civic leaders attempted to construct a community that
was politically homogenous and unified in its opposition to the
state and in its allegiance to the charterist cause. In our view
this centralising tendency can be seen to have had its roots in
the changes informing the UDF's political identity during this
period. In 1987 the UDF had adopted the Freedom Charter which
gave credence (however indirect) to orthodox notions of socialist
transition and the accompanying assumption that all political
(and otherwise) relevant knowledge is in possession of a single-
celled political entity , Initially the UDF had been intended as
a vehicle to bring together different strands of opposition to
the constitutional reforms and it had not identified its ideology
precisely. It had professed a "catchall" character and its loose
structure had provided promise of considerable political
diversity. The initial statements of the UDF were usually limited
to a few key principles intended to unite a broad social
spectrum, "from workers to students, from priests to businessmen,
Nyanga to Chatsworth, from SOWETO to Elsie's River". (See Lodge
and Nasson 1988: 129)
In the beginning, then, the strategic aim of the UDF was to
achieve wide-spread consolidation against the system and its
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ruling elite in and through a non-specific popular alliance
against the apartheid system. In time though, the politics of the
struggle against racial domination became geared towards the
establishment of a unified and collective subject under the
ideological leadership of a specific strand of opposition
politics. This tendency was hastened by the specific way in which
the form of the state/civil society structure evolved during this
period. As we indicated earlier a central feature of "civil
society" opposition during the 1980's was the logic of
confrontation with the centrally organised state apparatus, and
an awareness on the part of oppositional movements that the basic
contradiction of the apartheid system consisted in the opposing
interests of the ruling elite and society at large. Consolidation
against the apartheid system and its ruling elite became a key
objective of the tactics and strategies of political protest. A
logic of "simple polarisation" began to characterise the
political ideology of the opposition. This logic did not remain
simply at the level of national mono-organisations such as the
UDF or COSATD, but it also imprinted itself on charterist civic
organisations at a local level.
The logic of "simple polarisation" also became apparent in the
choice of tactics by the Bellville South civic. In many of the
working class coloured areas in Cape Town the choice of the
boycott as a tactics for mobilisation proved to be effective in
mobilising large section of the community into a unified
oppositional subject against the state. According to a UDF
regional organiser who convened the UDF area committee in the
Northern Areas in 1985,
"the boycott was our weapon of struggle.
There was an overwhelming response by the
people as they were struggling to pay their
accounts. It was the tool that built the
civics in these areas. We organised the
boycotts of services in a low-key manner,
through pamphlets for example, in order to
avoid state repression. Whole communities
could participate without the fear of state
repression. We kept in regular contact with
people. The boycotts helped us to engage in
a dialogue
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with the people in our
communities. The boycotts gave people the
opportunity to express themselves and to
vent their anger and frustration."
(Interview with author, November 1993)
The tactic of the boycott became a nodal point for a variety of
different strategic projects: firstly, as a mechanism for
mobilisation; secondly, as a mechanism for the fostering of
community unity and oneness; and thirdly (and perhaps as an
unintended consequence) a mechanism for the increasing freeing
of community associations from state tutelage. As such it
represented a complex interplay of democratic and undemocratic
features, ranging from an anti-pluralist emphasis on community
homogeneity to a democratic intent associated with the re-
construction of a specific and subjective community within the
larger body of civil society.
The Bellvillo South Civic Organisation from 1989-1993: Laying the
Seeds of Institutional Struggle
From 1989 onwards the civic began to emphasise more overtly the
issue of institutionalised bargaining. During this period the
civic (and with it civil society) emerged in a stronger sense,
i.e. it began in a significant way to determine or inflect the
course of state policy. Institutionalised bargaining emerged
forcefully from the early 1990 onwards when the civic involved
itself in the so-called "Morgan" campaign. The campaign started
when 300 families faced eviction from a farm owned by a Mr.
Morgan. Originally the farm had been a prison before it had been
bought by the Morgan family who changed it into a chicken farm.
After the purchase Mr. Morgan began to rent out the stables to
homeless families. A year later Morgan issued an eviction notice
to all the tenants. The civic was then approached by the families
to represent their cause. The civic began negotiating with the
local all-white municipality and gradually managed to strengthen
its position through a careful combination of legal
(institutionalised bargaining) and non-legal (mass activity)
strategies. The civic eventually won the case in the Regional
Court, but lost it in the Supreme Court. But while the legal
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battles were still being waged, the civic influenced the overall
political identity of the council. Responding to the Morgan
campaign the council agreed to develop new sites to house
families of the marginalised communities in Bellville South. It
also agreed to start local-level negotiations on a non-racial
municipality.
Underlying each wave of negotiation by the civic from 1989
onwards was a conception of the state as "contestable". The
strategy of negotiations made room for relations of mutual
interaction between the state and civil society. It contained an
implicit recognition that struggles within civil society play a
major role in shaping the nature of the state and that state
projects, in turn, directly impact oh civil society. It
represented an acknowledgement of the mutually determining and
symbiotic relationship between state and civil society.
Presently the civic leadership seems to acknowledge that the idea
of institutionalised procedural bargaining can, under certain
circumstances, become an important democratic means for the
empowerment of marginalised communities. Such a bargaining
strategy acknowledges the complexities of an advanced industrial
economy, and the sorts of problems associated with its
management. The bargaining alternative is based on the idea that
corporatist relations between different interest groups and
associations can provide a mechanism through which these groups
can participate in a pluralist negotiation of the common good.
Institutionalised pluralism in this sense supplements
representative democracy with alternative opportunities for
participation. In Bellville South civic leaders are arguing that
if they want a more democratic society they need to make room,
alongside the institutions of representative democracy, for a
multiplicity of democratically managed associations and
organisations which exercise effective control over the public
agenda. Such a plurality of independent organisations is seen as
important for the democratisation of the state. Institutionalised
bargaining is seen to provide a mechanism though which to
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organise a mutually determining relationship between the state
and civil society. This kind of institutionalised bargaining
would allow less powerful and resourceful interests to bargain
for a more equal distribution of the common good. Less powerful
interests would then not merely exist alongside or under more
powerful ones, but enter into a relationship with these. Such
bargaining describes a political structure and a system of social
relations intended to facilitate the pluralist negotiation of
social priorities. The process is one in which social priorities
are negotiated by independent interacts interacting in pluralist,
but inclusive structures and forums. It is based on the pluralist
principle of power differentiation, but represents a more
democratic pluralism by emphasising more forcefully the question
of co-operation between different pockets of interests.
Amongst civic leaders in Bellville South the emergence of
negotiation strategies has come with a celebration of the term
"civil society" and with a renewed assertion of political
pluralism in the community of Bellville South. Activists now
acknowledge diversity in the community and some pass critical
judgements on the civic's tendencies to homogenise the community
it situated itself in during the 1980's. Civic leaders who defend
"civil society" have highlighted institutional concerns regarding
the forestalment of a concentration of power. This.has involved
a rejuvenated concern with political pluralism and the dispersion
of power beyond the state. Concerns are expressed, however, about
the problem of implementing a pluralist politics in marginalised
communities where there still remains the need to carve out
political spaces in which political wills can be formed , i.e.
the need to build coherent political communities in which it
becomes possible to re-construct a democratic politics in the
wake of apartheid rule. Civic leaders in Bellville South are
presently confronted with the tensions between the need for a
political community (and its assumptions of political unity) and
the implementation of a pluralist democratic politics. This
tension is central to the implementation of a democratic politics
in post-apartheid South Africa. In conclusion, I want to present
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a few theoretical reflections on the problem of pluralism under
conditions of political marginalisation. It is with regard to
this problematic that the struggles of the civics during the
1980's left behind crucial questions for a future democratic
politics.
The history of pluralism is, of course, long and complex. Anglo-
American pluralism initially arose around the turn of the century
and peaked over the decade following the first World War. It
found its voices in the works of such Anglophone writers as
Harold Laski and Arthur Bently. It countered those theoretical
perspectives that affirmed the sovereign state as the centre of
political life. The second generation of pluralism found
expression in the 1950's and 1960's in the work of Robert Dahl,
amongst others. Unlike the first generation of pluralists, whose
connections to political struggle generated a critical
perspective on the state, the second generation was concerned
with the location of power in society. This, in their account
operated through a diffuse concatenation of autonomous and
competing groups, rather than through the socio-economic
sovereignty of a dominant elite whose interests determined the
policy outcomes of political institutions and processes. Kirstie
McClure identifies a set of features common to both these
generations of pluralism. Both pluralisms have been articulated
in opposition to unitary, monolithic or totalizing conceptions
of the political domain, particularly in so far as these presume
some singulary sovereign or unique agency overseeing or
determining political processes and/or social relations. Both
pluralisms insisted upon the irreducible plurality or
multiplicity of social groups. For both pluralist generations,
however, the political valence of such groups is understood to
have no necessary ontological grounding. They are not, in other
words, a political expression of essences, but appear, rather as
contingently constituted political entities, i.e. they emerge
through the dynamics of particular struggles arising within the
realm of the social, and are elaborated as political through a
process of articulation. Both view the social subject as a site
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of multiple and intersecting group memberships or identities
within that social plurality. Both of these generations begin
with a conception of the "political" which does not view
different groups as essences of any deeper identity or social
relation, but rather as self-defining and independent, in
particular of the state. They are understood to have no necessary
relation to state power in so far as they articulate such a
relationship.
At present we are in the midst of a third generation of pluralism
which includes a range of perspectives These include current
arguments for cultural pluralism and the recent theoretical work
of Chantal Mouffe. (See, for example, Mouffe 1992) The latter'a
understanding of the nature of pluralism requires a vision of the
political as a discursively constructed ensemble of social
relations. Mouffe1s conception of the political carries the same
meaning as the democratic revolution as analysed by Claude
lefort. Lefort identifies democracy with the disappearance of
landmarks of certainty. According to Lefort modern democratic
society is a society in which power has become an "empty place".
In such a society it is no longer possible to provide an
irrevocable guarantee because power is no longer incorporated
into a transcendental moment. As a result Lefort prioritises the
politics of rights over a politics concerned with an inherent or
a priori-interest. (See Lefort 1986)
Mouffe constructs her conception of pluralism in and through the
prism of the concept of citizenship. The search for a more active
conception of citizenship is a response to the limitations of the
statist conception of politics in many of the so-called existing
socialist countries. The so-called "citizenship" school has its
roots in a revival of the civic republican view of politics that
put a strong emphasis on the notion of a public good. The
"citizenship" school is based on the idea that politics is the
realm in which individuals recognise themselves as participants
in a wider political community. Proponents of this school call
for a greater role for active citizens participating equally in
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politics to determine the common good. All citizens should be
entitled to an active and equal part in the political governance
of their society and should have the citizenship rights and the
resources to make this possible. The emphasis on civil society
as a bed for participative citizenship depends heavily on the
generalisation of a sense of "civil virtue" in society, a culture
of commitment to public affairs and political activity. The
emphasis is on a plurality of associations encouraging the
democratic involvement of citizens. It is argued that this
pluralism of autonomous organisations broadens our view of
citizenship by not limiting it to membership of the state. The
citizen is educated into citizenship through voluntary
participation in a variety of roles in a variety of associations.
(See, for example Sandel 1982, Skinner 1984)
Defining the political community in this way, i.e. in terms of
a common commitment to a "common good" becomes all the more
important if we consider the limits of pluralism. The need for
a consensus on the framework within which pluralism is to
function becomes all the more important once we consider the
implications of a radically particularist interpretation of
pluralism. As Mouffe points out
"we would have made no advance at all if we were
simply going to replace the notion of a unified and
homogenous subject with a multiplicity and
fragmentation in which each of the fragments retains
a closed and fully constituted identity". (Mouffe
1992: 10)
The dangers of an excessive fragmentation of the political sphere
through an overly particularist conception of pluralism are
severe. Such an extreme form of pluralism according to which all
interests, all opinions, all differences are seen as legitimate,
could never provide the framework for a political community.
Society could easily degenerate into a fragmented asociality
which prevents any kind of social project. And this is precisely
where the limits of pluralism lie. Pluralism can never be total
in the sense of representing simply a collection of
particularised identities. Pluralism requires some measure of
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consensus amongst its different entities as to the necessity of
a pluralist framework in the first place. Thus, while it is
important to defend the widest possible pluralism in many areas -
culture, religion, morality - it is also necessary to acknowledge
that citizenship as a form of political identification
presupposes an allegiance to a set of political principles.
Those who conceive the pluralism of modern democracy as being
total and as having as its only restriction an agreement on
procedural rules, do not realize that there can never be pure,
neutral procedures without reference to normative concerns. It
is not enough to endorse a liberal problematic which simply
defines democracy as the absence of state interference in the
lives of its subjects, and which reduces the tasks of government
to the maximisation of negative freedoms. Democracy is far more
complex than that - it involves an ongoing search for deeper
historical and political dimensions.
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